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J. Colin McQuillan. Immanuel Kant: The Very Idea of a Critique of Pure Reason. Northwestern
University Press 2016. 192 pp. $99.95 USD (Hardcover ISBN 9780810132450); $34.95 USD
(Paperback ISBN 9780810132481).
J. Colin McQuillan’s Immanuel Kant: The Very Idea of a Critique of Pure Reason begins by noting
the surprising fact that ‘up to this point there has not been a single work that explains why Kant calls
the Critique of Pure Reason a critique’ (ix). In light of this oversight, McQuillan aims to provide ‘a
study of the background, development, exposition, and justification of Kant’s Critique of Pure
Reason’ that focuses on ‘Kant’s conception of critique, rather than his arguments for the transcendental ideality of space and time, his deduction of the pure concepts of the understanding, or the
objections he raises against traditional metaphysics’ (ix). McQuillan argues that it is precisely
‘Kant’s conception of a critique and his insistence that philosophy must begin with a critique of pure
reason that distinguishes his critical philosophy from his pre-critical philosophy’ (x); Kant’s mature
thought cannot be defined ‘by its opposition to the views he espoused during his pre-critical period’
(xi); Kant ‘never denied that metaphysics was possible or desirable’ (xii); and Kant’s critical philosophy aims to achieve ‘what he set out to accomplish in his pre-critical philosophy: a revolutionary
transformation of the method of metaphysics that would set metaphysics on the sure path of science’
(x). McQuillan’s thesis is that Kant’s ‘critique’ names a novel approach to metaphysics that begins
with the question of the ground of the relation between representations and objects.
After a brief overview of the conceptions of criticism at work in modern ‘philological critique’ (4-6), ‘literary criticism’ (6-10), ‘critique of taste’ (10-4), and ‘critical logic’ (14-7),
McQuillan provides an account of how and why the notion of critique first emerged in Kant’s thinking. He begins by examining Kant’s investigation of the method befitting metaphysics in his Prize
Essay (1764) and highlighting Kant’s methodological investigations in the mid-1760s. McQuillan
rightly notes that Kant’s preoccupation with the question of the proper method of metaphysics implies a logically prior concern with metaphysics simply. Thus, he criticizes scholars who argue that
Kant lost faith in metaphysics in the 1760s and emerged as a disillusioned skeptic. However, he also
questions scholars who acknowledge Kant’s abiding interest in metaphysics but claim that Kant’s
conception of the nature of metaphysics underwent a ‘dramatic change’ in the 1760s, specifically
those who emphasize Kant’s description of metaphysics as the ‘science of the limits of human reason’ (21, 40-41). While McQuillan acknowledges that Kant aims to ‘place metaphysics on a new
foundation’ (22) by articulating a method that ensures the success of metaphysical inquiry, he seems
committed to the conclusion that Kant’s conception of the nature of metaphysics is more or less
traditional, even as late as Kant’s Dreams of a Spirit-Seer Elucidated by Dreams of a Metaphysician
(1766). However, McQuillan does not explore the possibility that Kant’s methodological investigations led him to reinterpret metaphysics as a science of the limits of human reason. He also overlooks
the striking fact that Kant concludes Dreams of a Spirit-Seer by emphasizing the practical, moral
significance of metaphysics.
In any event, McQuillan goes on to explain that Kant’s pursuit of the proper method of metaphysics leads him to raise the question of the relationship between representations and objects—a
question Kant describes as the ‘key to the whole secret of metaphysics’ (42). To adumbrate McQuillan’s
compelling account: Kant’s Inaugural Dissertation (1770) emphasizes the difference between
sensible and intellectual cognition. Since Kant holds that metaphysics is concerned with rational
principles, not empirical concepts, he concludes that purifying the former of the latter will uncover
metaphysical inquiry’s proper objects, thereby clarifying its task and guaranteeing its efficacy. Kant
planned to elaborate this method in a work called The Bounds of Sensibility and Reason until a
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conversation with his former student Marcus Herz led Kant to see that purifying intellectual cognition
ultimately only raises the more fundamental question of how intellectual concepts are related to the
world. Thus, McQuillan uncovers a shift in Kant’s focus ‘from the “bounds” (Grenzen) of sensibility
and reason to the “ground” (Grund) of the relation between representations and objects’ (55). Further,
he notes that Kant’s rejection of Platonism, occasionalism, and pre-established harmony led him to
turn ‘to the understanding itself’ in order to pursue ‘an immanent account’ of the validity of
representations (59). Finally, McQuillan highlights that Kant’s notion of ‘critique’ first appears as a
description of his pursuit of an immanent account of the ground of objectively valid representations
(60).
McQuillan’s account of Kant’s first reference to ‘critique’ raises the question of whether and
how this early reference informs Kant’s mature philosophy. Thus, McQuillan examines Kant’s explicit discussions of the nature and purpose of critique in the Critique of Pure Reason. More specifically, McQuillan offers careful interpretations of four of Kant’s ‘definitions’ of critique therein: his
account of the critique of reason as a court of justice (65-70); his definition of critique as an investigation of the possibility of metaphysics (70-7); his description of the Critique as an attempt to transform the procedure of metaphysics (78-86); and his characterization of the Critique as an account of
the sources and boundaries of reason (86-8). While McQuillan’s interpretations of these passages are
compelling, one wonders why McQuillan does not devote more attention to the first Critique’s Doctrine of Method, which is explicitly concerned with elucidating the purpose of Kant’s critique of
reason.
McQuillan concludes his book by reflecting on Kant’s continued commitment to the project
of critique after the first Critique’s publication. Thus, he offers a helpful overview of Kant’s several
apologies for the notion of critique in the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics (91-6), the Preface
to the second edition of the first Critique (96-102), the so-called Kant-Eberhard controversy (1029), and finally in two oft-ignored late essays on the history of philosophy (109-11). This overview
demonstrates that the notion of a critique of reason remained central to Kant’s thinking until the end
of his philosophical career.
McQuillan’s book makes an important contribution to the scholarship, not only by correcting
for common accounts of Kant’s rejection of metaphysics in favor of ‘epistemology’, but also by
opening up the question of the nature and meaning of critique, as such. McQuillan deserves special
praise for his lucid prose, for his attention to historical context, and especially for the grace and
patience he exhibits as he guides readers through the dense arguments of Kant’s pre-critical writings.
I recommend the book to all students of the history of philosophy, Kant scholars and generalists
alike. By way of conclusion, I want to raise two questions—questions alluded to, but not explicitly
addressed by, McQuillan’s account.
First, McQuillan’s analysis of Kant’s critique of reason raises the question of the nature of
reason, as such. The answer to this question is necessary for explaining why humans undertake metaphysical inquiry and why such inquiry tends to lead to perplexities rather than knowledge. Accordingly, an account of Kant’s conception of reason is vital for any explanation of why the search for a
method of metaphysics is necessary and why reason stands in need of critique. Of particular significance in this context is the fact that Kant’s confrontation with Rousseau in the 1760s led Kant to
reinterpret the nature of reason as essentially spontaneous, purposive, and practical. McQuillan’s
excellent account of Kant’s quest for a proper method of metaphysics would benefit from being read
in conjunction with a careful examination of Kant’s ‘discovery’ of reason’s moral character. Such
an examination would have to pay special attention to Kant’s account of the relationship between
metaphysics and morality in Dreams of a Spirit Seer and his subsequent articulation of the intrinsic
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connection between the restriction of theoretical reason and reason’s practical extension in the first
Critique’s Doctrine of Method. Kant’s way of stressing the practical purpose of metaphysics in these
passages indicates that Kant’s critical philosophy may be grounded in a more radical transformation
of metaphysical inquiry than McQuillan suggests.
Second, McQuillan’s detailed examination of Kant’s notion of a critique of reason raises the
question of how such a critique is possible. How can one gain sufficient ‘critical’ distance from
reason to subject it to a critique? What capacity undertakes the critique of reason? Such questions
may seem stilted. Nevertheless, Kant suggests an answer, albeit a paradoxical one. For, even as it is
the object of critique, Kant indicates that reason undertakes this critique. Put differently, the critique
of reason is reason’s self-critique. This fact emerges most clearly in the first Critique’s Doctrine of
Method, where Kant claims that his critique portrays reason’s self-examination as it pursues selfknowledge. Kant concludes that reason’s self-knowledge ultimately allows reason to become legislative and autonomous, determining its activity in terms of its proper telos. That critique is somehow
grounded in reason’s reflexivity and in its purposive character is a fact that warrants further reflection.
It is, perhaps, a strength of McQuillan’s concise study that it does not violate the scope of its
project in order to address the questions posed above. A more important strength, however, is that
McQuillan gives us occasion to raise and reflect on these questions, which are vital not only for
understanding Kant but for philosophical reflection on the nature and purpose of philosophy as it
wrestles with that old Delphic injunction, ‘know thyself’.
Samuel A. Stoner, Assumption College
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